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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 2, Number 13 (July 23, 1997) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Counterweight to elected governors found in representatives  
Following just a few months of attempting to coordinate policy with Russia's 
recently elected local governors, President Yel'tsin has decided to strengthen the 
position of his representatives to the regions, apparently increasing their role in 
economic issues. Without the details from the decree, it is difficult to determine 
the exact nature of the new powers, however Presidential Council member 
Leonid Smirnyagin has commented that the edict envisions the creation of 
"collegiums of the top officials of all the territories." The Presidential 
Representatives will chair these collegiums. (Obshaya gazeta, 10 Jul 97) 
 
Yarov "vacationing" with Yel'tsin 
First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Yuri Yarov accompanied 
Yel'tsin on his vacation to Karelia and continues to supervise the president's 
schedule and appointments. (Interfax, 7 Jul 97) Yarov also worked closely with 
Yel'tsin throughout his illness and convalescence from heart surgery and is 
performing a function similar to the role Viktor Ilyushin played in his years of 
presidential service. In the polarized world of Kremlin politics, Yarov has been 
identified as a "Chernomyrdin man," however his continued presence at the side 
of the president suggests he has found accommodation with Chubais as well. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Daggers drawn as infighting continues 
If all the theories of shifting alliances and tit-for-tat are true, July has seen a 
marked increase in elite infighting as the struggle for Kremlin influence and 
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support returns to a familiar theme of corruption charges. There appear to be 
several fault lines of contention among current and former government members. 
One involves a reported split between Anatoli Chubais and Uneximbank 
President and former Finance Minister Vladimir Potanin. Just as Chubais was 
preparing to leave for vacation, Izvestiya published a report of a suspicious, 
interest-free loan provided by Aleksandr Smolensky's Stolichnii Bank to Chubais' 
Center for the Defense of Private Property. Potanin owns a substantial interest in 
Izvestiya and had recently skirmished with its editorial office in an attempt to 
exert greater control. (Izvestiya, 1 Jul 97) 
 
Within days, the head of the Central Bank, Sergei Dubinin, announced that 
former Finance Ministry employees were involved in questionable transactions 
that cost the budget $200 million. (ITAR-TASS, 14 Jul 97) Specifically mentioned 
in the accusations and investigation were former First Deputy Finance Minister 
Andrei Vavilov and Potanin. Dubinin eventually backed down on his allegations, 
withdrawing the charge of corruption and claiming only that Vavilov "brought 
certain harm to the budget." (Interfax, 15 Jul 97) It will be interesting to track the 
tenor of forthcoming Izvestiya articles on Chubais for signs of a continuing feud. 
 
Chernomyrdin also chose the opportunity of Chubais' absence to criticize the 
work of the Finance Ministry, currently overseen by Chubais. (ITAR-TASS, 8 Jul 
97) The real struggle, however, seems to be in attempts to remove Internal 
Affairs Minister Anatoli Kulikov. The persistent rumors of a merger of FAPSI into 
the FSB may be targeted at forming a strong enough power base to challenge 
Kulikov's authority. (Kuranty, 2 Jul 97) 
 
The recent intensification of the Chubais-Kulikov conflict apparently has its 
foundation in Kulikov's June criticism of the State Committee for Property (GKI), 
previously overseen by Chubais. (Kuranty, 2 Jul 97, Pravda rossii, 9 Jul 97) The 
Pravda report contains an account of a heated dispute between Chubais and 
Kulikov over GKI, during which Chubais allegedly threatened to have Kulikov 
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arrested through the Justice Ministry. It may well be unsupportable, but one 
cannot help imagining a direct line from Chubais' threat to the leak of an MVD-
held video compromising the justice minister to the rapid appointment of a likely 
Kulikov sympathizer, Sergei Stepashin.The countercharges of corruption and 
incompetence are likely to continue within the government throughout the 
summer as distinct "clans" and economic interests vie for influence. Chubais and 
his coalition of bankers have been ascendant for over a year, and with signs of 
the coalition disintegrating, it would be natural for challengers to stoke the fires of 
division. 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Kovalev claims authorship of restructuring plans 
In an interview with Moskovsky komsomolets (4 Jul 97), Federal Security 
Services (FSB) Chief Nikolai Kovalev contradicted previous reports that he had 
been taken by surprise by the presidential decree which outlines a reorganization 
of the service. "This is not true," said Kovalev, "I personally drew up the edict." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger 
 
Russians and Azeris to pump oil along Baku-Grozny-Novorossiisk route 
Political leaders of Russia and Azerbaijan agreed on 4 July to begin pumping 
Caspian Sea oil along a route from the Azeri port of Baku to the Chechen capital 
Grozny, then on to Novorossiisk, a Russian port on the Black Sea. 
 
The trilateral agreement was to be signed by commercial representatives of the 
three governments, but was supported by their politicians. Delivery of oil would 
require the rebuilding of a section of the pipeline that runs through Chechnya, but 
could begin within a month of signing a trilateral contract, according to Russian 
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First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, Moscow's representative at the talks. 
(Interfax, 1543 GMT, 4 Jul 97) 
 
Despite the agreement, relations among the three parties remain thorny. Baku 
objects to Russian plans to continue operating an early missile warning system in 
the Azeri town of Gabal, and claims Russia harbors a number of former Azeri 
political leaders, such as former Azeri president Ayaz Mutalibov, accused of 
undisclosed crimes. (Interfax, 1541 GMT, 4 Jul 97). And Chechen president 
Aslan Maskhadov appears only to have given the agreement his blessing after 
receiving assurances from Azeri leaders that Baku would help Chechnya rebuild 
oil refineries in Grozny, a gesture of cooperation that makes Moscow nervous. 
(Zerkalo, 5 Jul 97) 
 
Moscow appears to have acquiesced in the face of the threat that the Azeris 
would seek a route that bypassed Russian soil. Azeri president Heidar Aliev kept 
up the pressure as negotiations appeared to falter a week later, during a visit of 
Nemtsov to Baku. "I'll say frankly," Aliev warned Nemtsov, "that if you do not 
open this route up for us, we will have the opportunity to move oil along two other 
routes: one through Georgia to the port of Supsa, the other to the port of Ceyhan 
through Turkey." (Interfax, 1736 GMT 11 Jul 97) 
 
Estonia rejects offer of "security guarantees" extended by Russia 
Estonian Prime Minister Mart Siimann turned down Moscow's offer of security 
guarantees to Tallinn in return for Estonia's refusal to join NATO. 
 
"Estonia sees her security guarantees only in her integration into European 
institutions, including NATO," Siimann stated. "We know that NATO's door is 
open for us but now I do not want to debate the question of when we may come 
in though this door. However, we firmly believe that our security guarantees are 
linked with our joining NATO," he added. (Segodnya, 17 Jul 97). Russian Foreign 
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Minister Yevgeni Primakov had extended the offer on 13 July, shortly before 
meeting U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in St. Petersburg. 
 
Primakov slams chase of Bosnian Serbs, threatens review at NATO council 
Shortly after British attempts to capture alleged Bosnian Serb war criminals, 
Primakov said Russia disapproves of the action. The steps go beyond the 
peacekeepers' mandate and are not productive, he said. Nor was Russia 
consulted in advance. "I would very much like it if such actions did not recur," he 
said. The situation in Bosnia should be a subject of discussion at the very first 
session of the Russia-NATO permanent council. (Interfax, 1335 GMT, 14 Jul 97). 
 
NATO offers membership to East Europeans; Russia sees problems ahead 
At a meeting in Madrid on 9-10 July, leaders of NATO formerly invited the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the alliance. The alliance also signed a 
friendship treaty with Ukraine, although the alliance did not offer Kiev the 
extensive mechanisms for consultation that were granted to Moscow a month 
earlier. 
 
Russian newspapers continue to condemn the expansion. The expansion, wrote 
Trud, "marks the start of the process of NATO's advance toward our borders. 
And let us not forget that, for all its peace-loving statements, NATO remains 
primarily a military bloc." (Trud, 10 Jul 97) 
 
New weapons sales possible to Indonesia, Pakistan 
Indonesian Minister of State for Research and Technology Burhanuddin Yusuf 
Habibie, in Moscow for the first week of July, met with ministers of foreign 
economic relations and representatives of Rosvooruzhenie, the Russian arms 
merchant, in the hope of securing new aircraft. Russian sources said Jakarta had 
planned to purchase the American-built F-16 but, worried about pressure on 
Congress from human rights groups, had decided to investigate Russian-made 
 6 
weapons, including the multi-purpose fighter bombers Su-30. (ITAR-TASS, 0806 
GMT, 2 Jul 97) 
 
Meanwhile Russian ministers, reversing a long-standing ban, offered to sell tanks 
to Pakistan. Pakistani Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan, in Moscow on 10 July, 
said Islamabad may take up Russia's offer, and would welcome Russian 
mediation of the dispute with India over Kashmir. Russia had previously refused 
to sell weapons to Pakistan, for fear that such sales would jeopardize contracts 
for shipments to India. (Interfax, 1736 GMT, 10 Jul 97) 
 
Comment 
Cat-and-Mouse with the Baltics 
At first glance, Moscow's relations with the Baltic states, particularly with Estonia, 
seem schizophrenic. On the one hand, the Russian foreign ministry is capable of 
holding calm, sober meetings with Baltic leaders, such as the talks conducted 
between Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeev and Estonian Foreign 
Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves on July 3, which the latter felt had yielded 
progress on disagreements over the border. (Radio Tallinn Network, 1600 GMT, 
3 Jul 97). 
 
On the other, there are the ominous rumblings of Russian Foreign Minister 
Yevgeni Primakov, who, in discussions with his British counterpart, maintained 
that relations with Estonia and Latvia are hampered by the republics' "policy of 
discrimination" against their Russian-speaking populations. (Interfax, 1335 GMT, 
14 Jul 97). 
 
Into this odd mix of signals comes Primakov's recent pledge to provide the Baltic 
states with "security guarantees" in lieu of their acquiring full NATO membership. 
Primakov veiled the suggestion in the garb of flexibility, saying that such a 
system could be maintained either by Russia alone or by guarantees given jointly 
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by Russia and Western states. "We are not against using various forms," 
Primakov said. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0840 GMT, 13 Jul 97). 
 
Such "flexibility" would be instrumental in maintaining Russian influence over the 
vulnerable states. Since outright military action would surely prompt Western 
condemnation, Russia would have to move softly, bemoaning ill-defined 
"discrimination" against the Russian populations while inserting "peacekeepers" 
and "security forces" as part of an international force. Primakov's condemnation 
of the manhunt for Bosnian Serb war criminals tells one exactly how effectual he 
would like to see such international operations be. The West ought not to allow 
Moscow's apparent inconsistencies toward the Baltics to jell into an all-too-
consistent pattern of intimidation. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Political Parties, Legislative 
Branch, and Media 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Communist wins in Rostov by-election 
Nikolai Kolomeitsev, communist, has, by early accounts, won a State Duma seat 
in the southern Rostov region, an official in the local election commission told 
Interfax. Kolomeitsev won 39.76% of the votes cast, he said. Turnout in the 1 
June vote was 31.5%, while 25% makes the elections valid. Kolomeitsev fills the 
vacated seat of Sergei Shakhrai, who is currently the presidential envoy to the 
Constitutional Court. (Interfax, 1122 GMT, 2 Jun 97) 
 
Progressive Forces Union established 
The leaders of Russia Is Our Home, Reforms-New Policy, and the All-Russia 
Union of People's Homes signed an agreement on the creation of a Union of 
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Progressive Forces (SPS). The creation of the SPS is yet another attempt to 
unify those on the center-right of the political spectrum in opposition to the left. 
This is not the first, nor certainly the last, attempt to form some semblance of a 
two-, or at most a three-party system. Predictable failure lies not only in the 
personality cults at the center of each party, but also of an electoral system which 
puts much stress on a politician's regional or local loyalties. State-wide parties 
would seem to be difficult to hold together. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, Dom i 
otechestvo supplement, 31 May-6 Jun 97) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma completes work on a new law on terrorism 
The law defines a terrorist as someone who commits politically motivated 
violence--although religious and national motives will also be considered. The 
new law also allows for negotiations with terrorists, however, any negotiated 
settlement may not include the giving of weapons, drugs, money, airplanes, or 
helicopters to terrorists. The main point of the law is the creation of a federal 
commission capable of combating terrorism. Membership in such a commission 
would include the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), the FSB (Federal Security 
Service), the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), Federal Protection Service, the 
MO (Ministry of Defense), and the FPS (Federal Border Service). Its director 
would be one of the deputy prime ministers. Its first deputy would be the head. 
Possible governmental abuse of such a commission is clearly possible. By 
declaring a group or person a terrorist, the normal laws of the state are 
superseded. Implications for the rule of law are significant (Obshchaya gazeta, 
29 May-4 Jun 97). 
 
Federation Council approves Supreme Court candidates 
Pursuant to Article 83 of the constitution, candidates Sergei Vorozhtsov, deputy 
chairman of the Kirov regional court; Vladimir Zaitsev, a judge of the Sverdlovsk 
regional court; Gennadi Ivanov, a judge of the Rostov regional court; and 
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Vladimir Koval, a judge of the Tomsk regional court were approved by the council 
(ITAR-TASS,1702 GMT, 9 Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-97-160). 
 
MEDIA 
TV Tsentr starts broadcasting 
The new federal television company "TV Tsentr" began broadcasting 9 June on 
the third frequency channel. The cable and satellite television broadcasting 
consortium was created in early 1997 at the initiative of the Moscow government 
and under the patronage of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. The main point of "TV 
Tsentr's" debut is the creation of a television channel worthy of Moscow. It is no 
secret that the present popularity ratings and content of third channel programs 
have not suited the capital's authorities for a long while. The channel will also 
function as a mouthpiece for Mayor Luzhkov's national political ambitions, 
bypassing other state-run broadcasts whose loyalties over the years have clearly 
been with President Yel'tsin. The consortium is a joint-stock company whose 
controlling block of shares belongs to the Moscow city government (Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 10 Jun 97) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By CDR John G. Steele and Susan Cavan 
 
NATO-Russia Joint Council meets 
The first meeting of the NATO-Russia Joint Council was held, and the results 
exacerbated rather than settled the controversy over the extent to which Russia 
has gained a "veto" over alliance actions. Russia did gain a concession on the 
chairmanship of the council--it will now rotate among the three representatives at 
the head of the table: Russia, the secretary-general and an alliance member 
(also rotating). However, council members did not concede to Russia's demand 
that the secretary-general's chair should be eliminated, which would have left 
only Russia and an alliance member in the chair. (RFE/RL Newsline, 21 July 97). 
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Comment 
The work of the Joint Council will be dominated by the Russians to the extent 
that the alliance allows it to be so dominated. Russian intent is clear, purposeful 
and relentless--exert pressure until something is conceded. Alliance solidarity 
and backbone will be under continuous strain, and concessions will only 
precipitate additional demands. In this contest of will, the alliance may be facing 
its toughest test yet. 
 
Military reform calls for substantial troop reduction 
Boris Yel'tsin has signed a landmark decree on military reform. In short, it calls 
for a reduction in force strength by 500,000 to 1.2 million. The ground troops 
command is to be abolished; the strategic missile forces, the space defense 
force, and anti-aircraft missile units are to be combined; and the air defense 
forces are to be merged with the air force. Cuts in the defense ministry's central 
apparatus budget also are planned. (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 Jul 97). 
 
Comment 
These moves have been roundly criticized by a number of ex-military figures, 
including Lebed, Rodionov, and Rokhlin. Some of the initiatives make some 
sense, some are curious. It is by no means the comprehensive reform blueprint 
long promised, and is not explicitly coordinated with the new Defense Minister 
Igor Sergeev's reform plan, supposedly due later this month. The problem with 
presidential decrees in Russia is that there is no consistent record of compliance, 
particularly where entrenched bureaucracies are concerned. 
 
Rokhlin's "appeal" attracts disparate groups 
Retired General Lev Rokhlin, head of the State Duma's Committee on Defense, 
sent a much-publicized appeal to President Yel'tsin in late June on the condition 
of the armed forces and the need for urgent military reform. He also distributed 
the appeal among Duma deputies. He wrote to the president, he claims, because 
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the new Defense Minister Sergeev refused to address the Duma on the military 
reform plans, and because the presidential staff was blocking attempts by 
Federal Assembly leaders to contact the president on this issue. (Ekho moskvy, 
28 Jun 97) 
 
Rokhlin has previously expressed concerns about the state of the armed forces 
in the aftermath of the war in Chechnya, however on this occasion the appeal 
sounds more alarmist and the implications more resounding. As Rokhlin states, 
he felt he needed to address "the real danger of the army's disintegration and the 
absence of any rational explanation or justification for what is happening." (Ekho 
moskvy, 28 Jun 97) The timing of his appeal may also be linked to the very noisy 
dismissal of his friend, Igor Rodionov, from the post of defense minister in May. 
 
The aftereffects of Rokhlin's appeal are far from certain. His position as number 
three man in Our Home is Russia (NDR) prompted Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
to denounce the appeal at a party gathering in July: "It is intolerable to call 
essentially for disobedience to the leader of the state and to engage in direct 
political campaigning in the troops. ... Rokhlin's position was not coordinated with 
anyone. It contradicts our movement's program and the program of military 
reform which the president and government are implementing." (Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 5-11 Jul 97) 
 
Despite threats to remove him from the party, the NDR membership elected not 
to oust him. (ITAR-TASS, 3 Jul 97) This has led to some speculation that despite 
the public comments, Rokhlin's appeal had the tacit support of some NDR 
government members and was part of a campaign to discredit the current 
political and military leadership. (Moskovsky komsomolets, 7 Jul 97) Rokhlin, 
however, maintains that he received no support "either from the executive 
authority or, unfortunately, from the faction." (Ekho moskvy, 28 Jun 97) 
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Rokhlin has been gathering support for his cause and has formed a public "All-
Russia Movement for the Defense of the Army, Defense Industry, and Military 
Sciences." The movement has the backing and participation of several well-
known Russian leaders including the former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov; 
Arkadi Volsky and his Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; Stanislav 
Terekhov and his radical Union of Officers; and the Russian Union of Afghanistan 
veterans. In all approximately twenty public and political organizations have 
expressed their support for the new movement. (ITAR-TASS, 9 Jul 97) Following 
an initial meeting of supporters on 9 July, the movement's organizing committee 
issued an address to the president and prime minister, calling on them "to take 
urgent measures for halting collapse of the armed forces, military sciences and 
the defense industry." (Interfax, 9 Jul 97) 
 
Rokhlin is planning a constituent assembly for September, at which time he 
hopes to see the movement transformed into a powerful Duma faction. He claims 
to have support for this faction from among the membership of the Communist 
Party, the Liberal Democrats, and the Congress of Russian Communities. (ITAR-
TASS, 9 Jul 97) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
New wrangles over US policy towards Azerbaijan loom 
US policy towards Azerbaijan has long been held captive by the Armenian lobby. 
Recently Congressman Pallone put forth two resolutions: One claims a larger US 
role in resolving the Karabakh dispute; the other advises the president to 
promote the Armenian route for the oil pipeline to Turkey. (Moscow News, 10 Jul 
97) The administration's line was made clear by the US Ambassador to 
Azerbaijan, Richard Kauzlarich, who told the media that "Pallone's proposals are 
only proposals, and they cannot direct the actions of the US Government." 
 13 
Moreover, "Peace must be established in the region before the oil pipeline can be 
laid across Armenia." (Turan, 2 Jul 97) While the Congress has repeatedly 
penalized Azerbaijan on an unprecedented level, the administration has sought 
to ingratiate itself with the Azeri leadership to pave the way for US oil interests. 
When Aliev visits Washington DC in early August these lines of division are likely 
to become more manifest. (For the details on Amendment 907 to the Freedom 
Support Act and on Armenian efforts to secure the pipeline route ahead of any 
Karabakh resolution, see previous editorial digests.) 
 
The non-events of Aliev's Moscow visit 
On 3 July President Heidar Aliev visited Moscow for the first time as president of 
Azerbaijan. While in Moscow he signed a friendship and cooperation treaty which 
addresses none of the substantial tensions that have been plaguing relations 
between the two states. (For a text of the treaty see TASS, 3 Jul 97) The 
Russian/Azeri border remains closed, the status of the Caspian Sea remains 
contested, the future of the Russian lease of the Gabalin radar station remains 
unclear. Of the two oil contracts reached during the talks one was almost 
immediately challenged by Turkmenistan, which claims legal ownership of the 
field while Rosneft, the Russian company involved, has signaled that it may pull 
out of the deal. (Azadlyg, 10 Jul 97) 
 
The tripartite oil transport agreement 
The tripartite agreement on oil transit signed on 11 July by First Deputy Prime 
Minister Boris Nemtsov for Russia, SOCAR president Natik Aliev for Azerbaijan, 
and Yunko head Khozh-Akhmed Yarikhanov for Chechnya qualifies as the 
second non-event of the month. A restatement of two previous Russian-Azeri 
agreements, its main function was to give Chechnya a seat at the table that it 
demanded. However the Chechens also got less than they wanted: Their Azeri 
and Russian partners regarded the deal as entirely technical in nature (and 
decided in principle to carry the early oil to Novorossiisk as early as 1995) and 
hence regarded it as a commercial transaction rather than the international treaty 
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that Chechnya sought. As in the friendship and cooperation treaty the most 
pertinent points were omitted entirely from the discussion. For instance, 
Chechnya's portion of the tariff fees remains a point of contention. 
 
From the point of view of regional politics, the customs treaty that preceeded the 
oil transport treaty is of greater significance. One of its provisions provides for 
joint Russian-Chechen control of the Georgian-Chechen border. (Monitor, 14 Jul 
97) Aside from prompting the resignation of Shamil Basaev from the Chechen 
government, the provision marks the first substantial Chechen capitulation to 
Moscow and a betrayal of Georgia, perhaps Chechnya's most crucial ally. 
 
Minsk Group mediator countries use Denver as forum 
During the G-8 summit in Denver, Boris Yel'tsin, Bill Clinton, and Jacques Chirac 
issued a joint statement expressing their "profound concern" over the absence of 
resolution in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The three countries have appointed 
mediators who in May and June approached Yerevan, Stepanakert and Baku 
with a "comprehensive settlement." The Denver statement reiterates the support 
for the joint effort at the highest level of political leadership. (Interfax, 21 Jun 97) 
 
According to the mediators' plan, Armenia's military would pull out of non-
Karabakh Azeri land that they have been occupying. They would also pull out of 
Shusha. At that point OSCE peacekeepers, made up in large part of Russian and 
US personnel, would preside over the return of refugees to the region. Karabakh 
would be granted a wide degree of autonomy but would remain part of 
Azerbaijan. (Moscow News, 10 Jul 97) Whatever the merits of this scheme, it has 
not been endorsed by any of the parties to the conflict. 
 
Aliev's "campaign" begins 
On the last day of his Moscow visit, Aliev announced that he would run for a 
second term in the presidential elections next year. Promotion of Aliev's own 
personality cult and some unsavory actions against his opponents have already 
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emerged as the tactics most characteristic of his campaign. On 27 June the Azeri 
parliament, packed with Aliev supporters, voted to proclaim 15 June, the day that 
Aliev came to power in 1993, a state holiday. The anniversary of Aliev's coup 
against the popularly elected government of Abulfaz Elchibey will now be 
referred to as "the Day of the Liberation of the Azerbaijani people." (Panorama, 
28 Jun 97) The former president, Elchibey, has been living in Nakhichevan for 
the last four years, during which time his presidential term has expired. 
 
Recently Elchibey expressed his wish to return to Baku and resume a leadership 
role in the Azerbaijan People's Front (APF), the political party he headed which 
remains a leading opposition party to Aliev. Elchibey told an Azeri newspaper 
that he has not experienced any intimidation or official harassment since he 
came forward with his desire to return. (Zerkalo, 31 May 97) Nevertheless, he 
sought a parliamentary resolution granting him protection from persecution as a 
condition of his return to Baku. The parliament refused to consider this proposal, 
stating that any citizen of Azerbaijan can reside where he wishes and the case of 
the former president does not warrant any special protection. (BBC, 19 Jun 97) 
 
A more blatant effort to silence the opposition came when the Communist Party 
congress was forcibly dispersed on 30 June. According to Azeri press accounts 
the congress consisted of a few hundred deputies and a few dozen foreign 
guests. The speeches were moderate and no calls for revolutionary violence or 
the overthrow of the government were delivered. As the leader of the Liberal 
Party, Zakir Mamedov, told the press, only those parties that support the current 
regime are allowed to participate in the political process "those who speak the 
truth are being squeezed in every possible way ..." (Turan, 30 Jun 97) 
 
Trial of accused Russian spy opens 
Salman Ibragimov, a Georgian citizen, is accused of spying for the Russian 
General Staff's Main Intelligence Department in Tbilisi and is standing trial in 
Azerbaijan's Supreme Court. If found guilty he faces a prison term of 7-15 years 
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or the death penalty. Three others are accused of lesser charges; one of them, 
Akhad Mamedov, is an aide to Isa Gambar, the leader of the Musavat party. The 
Musavat party and the APF constitute the most substantial opposition parties. 
(Turan, 8 Jul 97) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Colonel Khudoiberdiev opposed to terms of peace agreement 
On 15 June, government troops at two checkpoints to the south of Dushanbe 
were disarmed and supplanted by forces loyal to Colonel Mahmud 
Khudoiberdiev, a former member of the Popular Front militia and currently deputy 
commander of the Presidential Guard in Qurghan Teppa (Clandestine Voice of 
Free Tajikistan, 0350 GMT, 18 Jun 97; FBIS-UMA-97-169, 18 Jun 97). 
Khudoiberdiev effectively controls all of Khatlon oblast' in southern Tajikistan. 
One of the checkpoints is located 30 km southeast of Dushanbe, and gives 
Khudoiberdiev's men control of the Fakhrobod mountain pass (one of the main 
access points to Dushanbe); the second checkpoint is located approximately 70 
km south of Dushanbe, close to the village of Dahanakiyik (Interfax, 1701 GMT, 
17 Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-97-168, 17 Jun 97). One Tajik Defense Ministry soldier 
was killed during the takeover of the Fakhrobod checkpoint and two army officers 
were kidnapped and are being held at Khudoiberdiev's headquarters in Qurghan 
Teppa, 100 km south of Dushanbe (Interfax, 1613 GMT, 18 Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-
97-169, 18 Jun 97). Col. Khudoiberdiev stated that his forces were compelled to 
take over these two checkpoints in order to protect the local population from 
further abuses by government soldiers. He claimed that the checkpoints were set 
up illegally and that local residents and travelers were tortured there (Clandestine 
Voice of Free Tajikistan, 0630 GMT, 20 Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-97-171, 20 Jun 97). 
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Apparently, Col. Khudoiberdiev is dissatisfied with some of the terms of the inter-
Tajik peace agreement, particularly with the section of the agreement which calls 
for the return to Tajikistan of those United Tajik Opposition (UTO) troops 
remaining in Afghanistan. He and his supporters announced that they would not 
permit the 460 UTO troops slated to be stationed in Dushanbe for the duration of 
the National Reconciliation Commission's work to enter the capital. Col. 
Khudoiberdiev told journalists that he is very disappointed in President 
Rahmonov's government for allowing Prof. Said Abdullo Nuri (the leader of the 
UTO) to come to Dushanbe to lead the National Reconciliation Commission and 
that he expected his own relationship with the Tajik government to deteriorate 
even further as a result (Interfax, 1701 GMT, 17 Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-97-168, 17 
Jun 97). Col. Khudoiberdiev has also demanded that President Rahmonov 
redivide Khatlon Oblast' into its two previous administrative units, the oblasts of 
Kulab and Qurghan Teppa, and that he dismiss several officials currently in the 
local Khatlon administration and replace them with appointees whom 
Khudoiberdiev favors. A protest meeting which Khudoiberdiev called in Qurghan 
Teppa to support his demands developed into a week-long rally (Clandestine 
Voice of Free Tajikistan, 0350 GMT, 18 Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-97-169, 18 Jun 97). 
 
A government delegation led by Abdulmajid Dostiev, deputy chairman of 
Tajikistan's Supreme Assembly, traveled to Qurghan Teppa to hold negotiations 
with Khudoiberdiev, but failed to make any headway toward resolving the conflict 
(Clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, 0350 GMT, 18 Jun 97; FBIS-UMA-97-169, 
18 Jun 97). President Rahmonov had invited Col. Khudoiberdiev to Dushanbe in 
order to discuss the settlement of his demands; however, Khudoiberdiev told 
Deputy Chairman Dostiev that he will not go to Dushanbe because he believes 
that the invitation is simply a ruse and that he would be imprisoned as soon as he 
reached the capital (Clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, 0530 GMT, 21 Jun 97; 
FBIS-SOV-97-172, 21 Jun 97). An anonymous Interfax source has reported that 
President Rahmonov's government issued an unofficial request to the CIS 
peacekeeping forces stationed in Tajikistan to aid in protecting Dushanbe from 
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an invasion by Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces, should the need arise. A unit of the 
201st Motorized Rifle Division is deployed in Qurghan Teppa, but thus far has 
only expressed its readiness to negotiate with Khudoiberdiev (Interfax, 1613 
GMT, 18 Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-97-169, 18 Jun 97). 
 
On 21 June, Col. Khudoiberdiev's forces attacked the Lenin District (located 17 
km west of Dushanbe) and killed eight Internal Affairs Ministry officials. The 
reasons for this attack were unknown, but there are rumors that Khudoiberdiev is 
planning to take control of both Dushanbe and Kofarnihon district, where the 
UTO has its headquarters (Clandestine Voice of Free Tajikistan, 0530 GMT, 21 
Jun 97; FBIS-SOV-97-172, 21 Jun 97). 
 
Comment 
This is Col. Mahmud Khudoiberdiev's third and boldest mutiny against the Tajik 
government. His forces are purported to be the strongest and best trained in the 
country, and he seems to command a great deal of respect and loyalty among 
his men, due to his various military successes. President Rahmonov has been 
forced to give in to many of Khudoiberdiev's previous demands, and may find 
himself compelled to meet at least a few of the colonel's current wishes, unless 
the Russian government and/or the commander of the CIS peacekeeping forces 
in Tajikistan become willing to bring some pressure to bear on Khudoiberdiev. 
However, since up until now Khudoiberdiev has been given virtually carte 
blanche to rule his own fiefdom (Khatlon Oblast') as he sees fit--he has managed 
to force a few local administrators out of office--it seems unlikely that either the 
Russian government or the CIS peacekeepers will involve themselves in the 
current conflict, even though it presents a very serious threat to the inter-Tajik 
peace process. In fact, Col. Khudoiberdiev's actions may suit the Russian 
government very well, because as long as he is able to challenge and even defy 
President Rahmonov's authority, Tajikistan will remain politically unstable and 
thus forced to depend on Moscow to guarantee its continued survival as a 
republic. This would allow the Russian government to maintain at least some 
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leverage in the affairs of the Central Asian republics, as well as providing it with 
ready access to the Afghan border. Khudoiberdiev's forces may even be aiding 
the Russian government in its efforts to funnel arms to General Ahmad Shah 
Mas'ud in Afghanistan. 
 
There are also unconfirmed reports that Uzbekistan is supporting Col. 
Khudoiberdiev and that one of his cohorts, the former mayor of Tursunzode, 
Ibodullo Boimatov, has taken refuge in Uzbekistan (Le Monde Diplomatique, July 
97). In fact, there are rumors that Khudoiberdiev himself might be ethnically 
Uzbek. This is also not at all an impossible scenario. The Uzbek government has 
also been giving aid to the anti-Taleban forces (most notably to General 
Dostum), and the good offices of someone like Khudoiberdiev, who is in control 
of much of the territory along the Tajik-Afghan border, could be very useful to 
Uzbekistan. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the Uzbek government has given up 
its intentions of regaining its former influence in the Tajik government, and if the 
Khujandi faction does not succeed in attaining a place in the new government, 
then perhaps Col. Khudoiberdiev will. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Denmark lends more than a hand 
Denmark has pledged to increase its financial support for the Baltic states' 
preparations to join the European Union (ETA, 5 Jun 97). The Scandinavian 
country has taken the three states under her wing in many of their attempts to 
participate in Western ventures. Denmark also reportedly has worked behind the 
scenes to ensure a sufficient feeling of security for the region once it became 
clear that NATO admission for the three Baltic states was unlikely in the first 
round of enlargement. A plan developed by the Danes encompasses 
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coordination of economic aid as well as military cooperation (Berlinske Tidende, 
3 Apr 97). 
 
Military cooperation provokes Russian warning 
The Baltic states peacekeeping battalion (BALTBAT) is ready for its first mission, 
and is awaiting a UN-determined destination (ETA, 9 Jun 97). The battalion, 
which combines infantry units from all three states, is the most advanced portion 
of a three-pronged military cooperation venture between the countries, which 
also have organized a joint mine squadron (BALTRON) and a combined air 
control system (BALTNET). 
 
While these efforts were not enough to ensure a hearty NATO welcome, they did 
provoke a warning in the Russian media. Military cooperation between the three 
countries as a whole, and particularly BALTNET, were cited in Nezavisimoye 
voyennoye obozreniye (29 Mar 97) among the examples of "anti-Russian policy 
in the Baltic region...headed up by the United States of America." NATO 
exercises in the Baltic Sea, bilateral ties between the Baltic states and the US, 
and participation in the Partnership for Peace program rounded out the list of 
examples. 
 
ESTONIA 
Ethnic relations come under scrutiny 
In April Max van der Stoel, the OSCE chief commissioner for ethnic minorities, 
cited a significant improvement in the situation of ethnic minorities in Estonia 
since 1993. He did, however, note room for further improvements, with the 
possible simplification of language tests and the granting of citizenship to all 
children born in Estonia, regardless of their parents' citizenship (ETA, 9 Apr 97) 
 
The new government of Mart Siimann appears to be taking van der Stoel's 
concerns seriously. In May the government reinstituted the post of Ethnic 
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Relations Minister (Radio Tallinn Network, 14 May 97), a position which had 
been abolished by Mart Laar's government a few years previously. 
 
According to January 1997 statistics, Estonia has just under 1.5 million persons: 
64 percent (957,000) are Estonian citizens; 15 percent (100,000) are citizens of 
another country, primarily Russia; while 22 percent (335,000) hold no citizenship 
in any country but do possess residence permits in Estonia (Svenska Dagbladet, 
4 Apr 97). The director-general of the Citizenship and Immigration Board, Andres 
Kollist, estimated the number of illegal aliens in Estonia to be 20,000-30,000 
(ETA, 12 May 97). 
 
Courting of Russian favor only goes so far 
A Chechen parliamentary delegation was refused entry by the Estonian 
government because its members lacked acceptable travel documents. 
According to Prime Minister Mart Siimann, Estonia refused to issue special 
permits allowing the five parliamentarians entry (although Latvia and Lithuania 
had done so) based on the belief that promoting relations with Chechnya "might 
affect relations with other countries, primarily Russia." (ETA, 16 Jun 97) 
 
While the Estonian government is apparently willing to court favorable relations 
with Russia to some degree, the country's military development plan sends 
another signal, as NATO admission continues to be the ultimate goal. According 
to Minister of Defense Andrus Oovel, the development plan through the year 
2000 calls for reform of the training program, development of social guarantees 
for service personnel, development of infrastructure, and weapons/equipment 
modernization. 
 
LATVIA 
Crime brings profit to government officials 
Corruption reportedly is alive and well in all branches of the Latvian government, 
according to a European Union commission (Literaturnaya gazeta, 5 Mar 97). 
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According to the EU experts, "one-third of the turnover of goods and services in 
Latvia is controlled by criminal groups, and 50 percent of the profits obtained by 
criminal means goes toward bribing officials." The experts also concluded that 
organized crime in Latvia is connected directly to Russia. 
 
The government has attempted to control possible conflicts of interest within its 
ranks through the anti-corruption law passed last year which prohibits high-level 
government officials from retaining private sector positions simultaneously. 
Recently the law, and at least the appearance of impropriety, have brought about 
the resignations of several members of the government, including Minister of 
Defense Andrejs Krastins (Interfax, 9 May 97), Minister of Culture Rihards Piks 
(Radio Riga Network, 16 Jun 97), State Health Minister Juris Vinkelis (Interfax, 
26 Jun 97), and Minister of Transportation Vilis Kristopans (Radio Riga Network, 
21 Jul 97). 
 
LITHUANIA 
Military faces shortage of healthy conscripts 
The Lithuanian military continues to be built on a somewhat shaky foundation. 
Besides chronic shortages of equipment and weapons, the armed forces must 
deal with a severe shortage of healthy conscripts. Only about 50 percent of those 
drafted actually show up, and more than one-half of those who show up are 
unable to pass the health examination, according to Defense Minister Ceslovas 
Stankevicius (ELTA, 11 Apr 97). 
 
Still, the armed forces are managing to muster some troops capable of 
participating in international gatherings, such as the joint Baltic states squadrons 
BALTBAT, BALTRON, and BALTNET, as well as the Baltic Amber Sea '97 
exercises, Cooperative Nugget exercises held in Louisiana in early June, and the 
Cooperative Safeguard humanitarian aid exercises scheduled for the end of July 
in Iceland (ELTA, 5 Jun 97). 
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